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Introduction	  	  
The	  Eurozone	  crisis	  brought	  the	  question	  of	  public	  finance	  oversight	  sharply	  into	  focus.	  In	  February	  
2010,	  as	   the	  global	   financial	  crisis	  morphed	   into	  a	  deep	  crisis	  of	   the	  single	  currency,	   the	  attendant	  
problems	  were	  framed	  as	  fiscal	  profligacy	  in	  the	  Eurozone	  state	  of	  Greece.	  Over	  the	  next	  four	  years,	  
as	   the	  Union	   struggled	   to	   bring	   the	   acute	   phase	  of	   the	   crisis	   to	   an	   end,	   the	  question	  of	   Eurozone	  
economic	  governance	  came	  to	  the	  fore.	  Agreement	  was	  reached	  on	  a	  host	  of	  new	  regulations	  –	  Six-­‐
Pack,	  Fiscal	  Compact	  and	  Two-­‐Pack	  –	  designed	  to	  oversee	  the	  public	  finances	  and	  macro-­‐economy	  of	  
the	  member	  states,	  particularly	  members	  of	  the	  Eurozone.	  Without	  the	  crisis	  there	  would	  have	  been	  
no	  pressure	   to	   reform	   the	  economic	   governance	   regime	  or	   to	  agree	  on	   the	  Fiscal	  Compact,	  which	  
was	   negotiated	   outside	   the	   formal	   treaty	   framework.	   An	   important	   feature	   of	   the	   EU’s	   crisis	  
response	   was	   the	   parallel	   negotiations	   on	   crisis	   management	   (bail-­‐outs	   and	   other	   rescue	  
instruments)	   and	   crisis	   prevention,	   ushering	   in	   a	   new	   regulatory	   framework	   for	   economic	  
governance.	   It	   was	   politically	   necessary	   to	   address	   both	   the	   immediate	   crisis	   and	   the	   future	  
economic	   governance	   of	   the	   Eurozone	   simultaneously.	   The	   negotiations	   on	   economic	   governance	  
involved	  intense	  negotiations	  among	  the	  member	  states	  and	  EU	  institutions	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  crisis.	  
The	  negotiations	  required	  the	  deployment	  of	  different	  legal	  instruments	  and	  the	  relative	  weights	  of	  
different	  EU	  institutions	  varied	  depending	  on	  the	  negotiations	  in	  question.	  	  	  
This	  article	  goes	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  puzzles	  addressed	  in	  this	  special	   issue.	  First,	   it	   is	  central	  to	  the	  
first	  question	  posed,	  namely,	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  capacity	  of	  the	  Union	  in	  the	  eye	  of	  the	  crisis.	  The	  
negotiations	  analysed	  here	  were	  crucial	   to	   the	  Union’s	  crisis	   response,	  particularly	   to	   the	  ability	  of	  
political	   actors	   to	   take	   highly	   controversial	   decisions	   to	   give	   financial	   assistance	   to	   a	   number	   of	  
programme	   countries.	  Governments	   in	   the	   creditor	   countries	   needed	   to	   tell	   their	   parliaments	   and	  
publics	   that	   the	  design	   faults	   in	   the	  Eurozone’s	   economic	   governance	  were	  being	   addressed.	   Thus	  
the	   functional	   pressures	  were	   both	  major	   and	  urgent	   in	   this	   policy	   area.	   Second,	   the	   negotiations	  
provide	  an	  important	  lens	  into	  the	  power	  and	  strategies	  of	  various	  institutional	  actors	  which	  allows	  
us	  to	  probe	  the	  decision-­‐making	  style	   in	  this	  period,	  the	  traditional	   ’Community	  method’	  or	  a	   ‘new	  
intergovernmentalism’	  (Puetter	  et	  al,	  2014).	  Third,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  policy	  outputs	  of	  these	  three	  
negotiations	  enables	  us	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  reforms	  in	  terms	  of	  Hall’s	  
categorization	  of	  different	  orders	  of	  change	  (Hall,	  1993).	  	  
Europe’s	  economic	  governance	  reform	  
The	  euro	  crisis	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  significant	  reform	  (‘a	  decisive	  change’)	  of	  Europe’s	  fiscal	  surveillance	  
regime.	  Among	  the	  number	  of	  policy	   initiatives	  undertaken	  at	   the	  height	  of	   the	  crisis,	   i.e.	  over	   the	  
period	  2010-­‐2013,	  to	  reform	  EMU’s	   incomplete	  economic	  governance,	  three	  key	  developments	  are	  
particularly	  noteworthy:	   (1)	   the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	   (SGP),	   the	   fiscal	   cornerstone	  of	  Europe’s	  
Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Union	   (EMU)	  which	  was	  strengthened	  and	  expanded	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Six	  
Pack”;	  (2)	  a	  new	  international	  agreement	  branded	  ‘Fiscal	  Compact’	  was	  adopted	  to	  enshrine	  the	  rule	  
of	   balanced	  budgets	   into	  national	   law	  and	   (3)	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Two	  Pack’	   came	   into	  being	   to	   further	  
institutionalise	  the	  European	  Semester	  and	  to	  lay	  down	  a	  community	  framework	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  
financial	   assistance.	   The	   common	   thread	   of	   these	   substantial	   initiatives	   is	   that	   they	   aimed	   at	  
strengthening	   the	   credibility	   and	   enforceability	   of	   the	   EMU’s	   rules-­‐based	   economic	   coordination	  
regime	   through	   further	   formal	   competence	   transfer	   and	   an	   improvement	   of	   the	   EU’s	   problem-­‐
solving	   capacity.	   Although	   all	   three	   sets	   of	   negotiations	   were	   designed	   to	   enhance	   economic	  
governance,	  the	  legal	  nature	  and	  basis	  of	  the	  policy	  instruments	  differed	  as	  did	  the	  constellation	  of	  
actors	  (and	  hence	  veto	  players)	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiations	  -­‐	  see	  Table	  1	  which	  provides	  an	  overview	  
of	  the	  legal	  nature	  and	  decision	  rule	  that	  governed	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  new	  instruments.	  There	  is	  an	  
important	   distinction	   between	   the	   ‘Six	   Pack’	   and	   the	   ‘Two	   Pack’	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   which	   are	  
secondary	  EU	  legislation	  and	  the	  Fiscal	  Compact	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  which	  is	  an	  international	  treaty.	  	  
	  
  2	  
The	  Eurozone	  crisis	  did	  not	  fundamentally	  affect	  the	  EU’s	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  notwithstanding	  
the	  significance	  of	  the	  reform	  agenda.	  Instead,	  it	  provided	  an	  important	  testing	  ground	  for	  the	  newly	  
adopted	   Lisbon	   provisions	   which,	   when	   implemented	   under	   the	   pressures	   of	   the	   crisis,	  
fundamentally	   changed	   the	   institutional	   landscape	  of	   EMU.	  Overall,	  major	   innovations	   in	   terms	  of	  
actors	   involved,	   policy	   processes	   and	   policy	   content	   have	   occurred.	   This	   goes	   against	   the	  
expectations	  of	  an	   institutional	  paralysis	  or	  gridlock	  driven	  by	  a	   joint	  decision	  trap.	  Ways	  out	  have	  
always	   been	   found	   to	   reach	   common	   solutions,	   and	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact,	  
reforms	  have	  enhanced	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  capacity	  of	   the	  Union	   (see	  table	  2	  which	  classifies	   the	  
degree	  of	  change	  as	  major).	  The	  article	  proceeds	  as	   follows:	   the	  negotiations	  on	  the	   ‘Six	  Pack’	  and	  
’Two	  Pack’	  are	  analysed	  sequentially	  as	  they	  were	  both	  negotiated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  treaty	  provisions,	  
followed	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  outlier,	  the	  Fiscal	  Compact,	  which	  was	  negotiated	  as	  an	  international	  
treaty.	  	  The	  analysis	  encompasses	  the	  negotiations	  of	  each	  new	  instrument	  and	  the	  outcome.	  	  
	  
The	  ‘Six	  Pack’	  
	  
Agreeing	  on	  the	  ’Six	  Pack’	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  Lisbon	  	  
	  
The	   context	   of	   the	   ’Six	   Pack'	   reform	  was	   the	   urgent	   crisis	   induced	   pressure	   to	   act	   to	   ‘restore	   the	  
credibility	   of	   the	   EU	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   markets’1.	   The	   historic	   resistance	   to	   reform	   that	   was	   long	  
considered	  the	  central	  economic	  policy	  coordination	  in	  EMU	  (the	  SGP)	  abated:	  ‘this	  new	  framework	  
had	   to	   be	   created	   in	   a	   rush’,	   as	   a	   Commission	   official	   puts	   it2.	   One	   often	   forgets	   that	   due	   to	   the	  
density	  of	   the	  euro	  crisis,	   that	   the	  SGP	   reform	  was	   the	   first	  policy	  action	  undertaken	  by	  European	  
leaders	   to	   counteract	   the	   volatility	   of	   the	   bond	  markets	   and	   to	   ensure	   that	   bail-­‐outs	   would	   pass	  
muster	   in	   the	   creditor	   states.	   Far	   from	  anticipating	   the	   systemic	  effects	   that	   the	   large-­‐scale	  Greek	  
fiscal	   data	   falsification	   would	   have	   on	   Europe’s	   financial	   stability,	   the	   first	   reaction	   of	   European	  
leaders	   in	   2010	  was	   to	   address	   the	   design	   failures	   of	   the	   SGP	   and	   restore	   its	   credibility.	   As	   an	   EP	  
official	  highlighted3,	  ‘non	  compliance	  with	  rules	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  crisis,	  not	  the	  good	  
or	   bad	   performance	   of	   economies’.	   Consensus	   to	   act	   emerged	   quickly.	   Although	   the	   Six	   Pack	  was	  
adopted	  in	  first	  reading,	  it	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  lengthy	  first	  reading	  process:	  14	  months	  passed	  between	  
the	   issuing	   of	   the	   Commission	   proposals	   (September	   2010)	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   legal	   acts	  
(November	   2011).	   Two	   crucial	   elements	   may	   explain	   this	   lengthy	   and	   novel	   process:	   (a)	   a	   power	  
game	   between	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   European	   Council	   in	   agenda-­‐setting,	   and	   (b)	   a	   struggle	  
between	  the	  European	  Council,	  the	  EP	  and	  the	  Commission	  in	  law-­‐making.	  	  
	  
Agenda-­‐setting	   on	   the	   ‘’Six	   Pack’’	  was	   novel	   as	   consensus-­‐building	   on	   the	   key	   provisions	   occurred	  
upstream	   of	   the	   Commission	   proposal,	   as	   part	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   Task	   Force	   Van	   Rompuy	   (TFVR),	  
named	  after	  the	  President	  of	  the	  European	  Council.	  In	  March	  2010,	  European	  Council	  President	  Van	  
Rompuy	  and	  the	  Commission	  were	  requested	  by	  the	  European	  Council,	   in	   its	  conclusions4,	   to	  draw	  
up	   a	   new	  programmatic	   agenda	   to	   	   reform	   the	   fiscal	   governance	  of	   EMU	  with	   a	   view	   to	   ensuring	  
‘better	   budgetary	   discipline,	   exploring	   all	   options	   to	   reinforce	   the	   legal	   framework’	   (European	  
Council,	   2010).	   The	  presence	  of	   the	  new	  office	  of	   President	  of	   the	  European	  Council	   provided	   the	  
EU’s	  leadership	  with	  an	  alternative	  actor	  to	  the	  Commission	  in	  agenda-­‐setting.	  This	  marked	  the	  start	  
of	   an	   agenda-­‐setting	   contest	   between	   the	   Commission,	   which	   traditionally	   cherished	   its	   policy	  
shaping	   power,	   including	   on	   the	   EMU	   (the	   Delors	   Committee	   is	   a	   telling	   precedent),	   and	   the	  
European	  Council.	  An	   interviewee	   involved	   in	   the	  early	  work	  of	   the	  Task	   Force	  witnessed	   ‘French-­‐
German	   pressure	   to	   take	   the	   lead	   and	   to	   not	   leave	   the	   initiative	   to	   the	   Commission’5.	   This	   view	  
                                                
1
	  Interviewee	  3	  –	  1	  December	  2014,	  Brussels.	  
2
	  Interviewee	  2	  –	  3	  November	  2014,	  Brussels	  
3
	  Interviewee	  4	  –	  10	  December	  2014,	  Brussels	  
4
	  26-­‐27	  March	  2010	  European	  Council	  conclusions. 
5	  	  Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	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supports	   the	   characterisation	   of	   the	   Task	   Force	   Van	   Rompuy	   as	   acting	   as	   the	   European	   Council’s	  
‘policy	  patrol’	   (Chang,	   2013)	  by	   constraining	   the	  Commission’s	   autonomous	  agenda-­‐setting	  power.	  
The	  latter,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  showed	  no	  willingness	  to	  surrender,	  with	  EU	  Commissioner	  Olli	  Rehn	  
allegedly	  declaring	  at	  the	  first	  TFVR	  meeting:	  ‘I	  take	  note	  of	  this	  Task	  Force	  but	  I	  will	  make	  proposals	  
in	  independence’6.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  statement,	  the	  Commission	  published	  a	  communication	  to	  set	  the	  
agenda	  of	  the	  SGP	  reform	  on	  12	  May	  2010,	  just	  10	  days	  before	  the	  first	  and	  most	  strategic	  meeting	  
of	  the	  TFVR	  due	  to	  convene	  on	  21	  May	  2010.	  Another	  Commission	  Communication	  followed	  a	  few	  
weeks	   later	  on	  30	   June	  2010.	  The	  substantive	  content	   revealed	   the	  Commission	  was	  keen	   to	  seize	  
the	   momentum	   of	   the	   Eurozone	   crisis	   to	   fix	   some	   of	   the	   EMU’s	   fiscal	   governance	   flaws	   and	   to	  
challenge	   the	   institutional	   status	  quo,	  a	  strategy	   that	  was	  apparent	   in	   the	  Commission’s	  discourse.	  
The	   Commission	   repeatedly	   referred	   to	   functional	   arguments,	   highlighting	   the	   clear	  
‘interdependence’	   (Commission,	  2010a:	  1)	  or	   the	   ‘deep	  economic	  and	   financial	   linkages	  within	   the	  
euro	   area’	   (Commission,	   2010a:	   5)	   to	   justify	   its	   task	   expansion	   in	   the	   EMU’s	   surveillance	  
(Commission,	  2010a,	  2010b).	  The	  institutional	  rivalry	  with	  the	  European	  Council	  continued	  until	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  Task	  Force	  proceedings.	  	  One	  Council	  official	  recalled:	  ‘in	  September	  [2010],	  there	  was	  the	  
feeling	  that	  the	  TF	  would	  adopt	  conclusions	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  views,	  and	  which	  were	  
not	   going	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   Community	   method’7.	   When	   the	   Commission	   unveiled	   its	  
comprehensive	  package	  on	  29	  September	  2010,	  i.e.	  one	  month	  before	  the	  final	  adoption	  of	  the	  Van	  
Rompuy	  report,	  the	  same	  interviewee	  remembered	  that	  ‘Schaüble	  was	  very	  angry’8.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  institutional	  novelty	  which	  contributed	  to	  slowing	  down	  the	  legislative	  process	  of	  the	  co-­‐
decision	   procedure	   to	   revise	   the	   SGP	  was	   the	   co-­‐decision	   power	   of	   the	   EP.	   This	   implied	   both	   the	  
involvement	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (EP)	  as	  a	  co-­‐legislator	  but	  also	  entailed	  the	  development	  of	  
a	   cooperative	   relationship	   between	   the	   EP	   and	   the	   incumbent	   EMU	   actors	   (the	   Council	   and	   the	  
Commission)	  who	  previously	  had	  no	  need	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  Parliament	  on	  EMU	  matters.	  As	  a	  first	  
time	  participant	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  new	  economic	  governance	  regime,	  the	  EP	  had	  an	  active	  role	  
during	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Six	  Pack	  but	  it	  took	  some	  time	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  constructive	  
relationship	  with	  the	  Commission.	  Although	  formally	  not	  all	  of	  the	  legislative	  proposals	  required	  co-­‐
decision	  (4	  out	  of	  6	  texts),	  the	  EP	  used	  the	  package	  deal	  nature	  of	  the	  negotiations	  to	   influence	  all	  
provisions	  of	  the	  Six	  Pack	  and	  always	  worked	  with	  one	  team	  of	  negotiators.	  One	  trilogue	  participant	  
recalled	  that	  ‘the	  trilogues	  were	  enormous	  in	  size	  in	  the	  Six	  Pack’9	  since	  all	  aspects	  were	  negotiated	  
as	   a	   package.	   Another	   EP	   interviewee	   confirmed	   there	  was	   ‘much	  discussion	   in	   the	   EP	   before	   the	  
ECON	   vote’	   and	   to	   illustrate	   this,	   added	   ‘making	   a	   rough	   calculation	   of	   meeting	   hours,	   an	   MEP	  
reached	  the	  figure	  of	  200	  hours’10.	  In	  the	  account	  of	  EP	  officials,	  the	  Commission	  was	  rather	  passive	  
and	  immune	  to	  suggestions	  coming	  from	  the	  Parliament,	  an	  attitude	  that	  can	  be	  partly	  explained	  by	  
the	   fact	   that	   ‘DG	  ECFIN	  was	  not	  used	   to	   co-­‐decision	  procedure,	   they	  were	   in	  Beaulieu11,	   far	  away,	  
doing	  forecasts’12.	  For	  example,	  although	  the	  European	  Semester	  was	  an	  old	  Commission	  idea,	  it	  was	  
the	  ‘EP	  which	  codified	  the	  European	  Semester	  into	  the	  Six	  Pack”...’ECFIN	  said	  it	  wouldn’t	  happen’13.	  
Overall,	   the	   degree	   of	   centralisation	   agreed	   in	   the	   Six	   Pack	   owed	   a	   lot	   to	   the	   crucial	   contribution	  
made	  by	  the	  EP	  who	  strongly	  advocated	  further	  sovereignty	  transfers	  to	  the	  EU	  level	  to	  enforce	  fiscal	  
discipline.	   In	   the	   words	   of	   one	   of	   the	  most	   active	   EP	   rapporteurs	   on	   the	   package,	   the	   EP	   clearly	  








Interviewee	  6	  -­‐	  5	  December	  2014,	  Brussels.	  
10	  
Interviewee	  3	  –	  1	  December	  2014,	  Brussels.	  	  
11	  Beaulieu	  refers	  to	  the	  Commission	  building	  in	  which	  DG	  ECFIN	  used	  to	  have	  its	  offices	  until	  they	  got	  moved	  to	  the	  Charlemagne	  building	  
in	  2013.	  It	  is	  located	  outside	  of	  the	  Brussels	  ‘quartier	  européen’.	  To	  get	  an	  idea,	  it	  is	  located	  six	  metro	  stops	  away	  from	  Schuman,	  the	  
centre	  of	  the	  ‘quartier	  européen’.	  For	  more:	  http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2013/02/20/ecfin-­‐sits-­‐next-­‐to-­‐the-­‐king/	  	  
12
	  Interviewee	  6	  -­‐	  5	  December	  2014,	  Brussels. 
13	  
Interviewee	  7,	  29	  October	  2014,	  Brussels. 
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favoured	  a	  reduction	  of	   ‘horse-­‐trading’14	   (Goulard,	  2011:3)	   in	  Council	  deliberations	  about	  sanctions	  
and	  was	  a	  key	  problem-­‐solving	  actor	  when	  it	  promoted	  the	  Reversed	  Qualified	  Majority	  Voting	  in	  the	  
Council	   over	   sanctions,	   thereby	   undoing	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   grand	   French-­‐German	   bargain	  
previously	  made	  in	  Deauville15.	  	  
	  
The	  "Six	  Pack":	  a	  familiar	  flavour	  but	  a	  new	  game	  
	  
While	  the	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  (SGP)	  remained	  broadly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  minimal	  requirements	  of	  
the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  in	  its	  first	  (1997)	  and	  second	  (2005)	  versions,	  the	  2011	  reform	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘Six	  Pack’	  –	  was	  a	  critical	  juncture	  in	  competence	  distribution,	  despite	  representing	  a	  continuation	  of	  
rules-­‐based	  coordination.	  Through	  regulatory	  means,	  it	  broadened	  and	  deepened	  centralised	  control	  
over	  domestic	  economic	  policies	  and	  in	  particular	  over	  fiscal	  policies	  and	  saw	  the	  novel	  involvement	  
of	  the	  European	  Council	  and	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  The	  Six	  Pack	  reform	  process	  evolved	  under	  
the	  shadow	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  which	  foresaw	  the	  creation	  of	  two	  new	  actors	  who	  became	  a	  central	  
part	   of	   the	   EMU	   scene:	   the	   permanent	   President	   of	   the	   European	   Council	   (art.	   15	   TFEU)	   and	   the	  
European	   Parliament	   (art.	   121-­‐6),	   which	   had	   a	   role	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   multilateral	   surveillance	  
procedure	  (i.e.	  most	  aspects	  of	  the	  SGP)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  extension	  of	  co-­‐decision	  foreseen	  by	  the	  
Lisbon	  Treaty.	  	  	  
	  
The	   SGP’s	   2011	   reform	   subjected	   member	   states	   to	   a	   higher	   and	   more	   intrusive	   scrutiny;	   it	  
strengthened	   sanctions	   while	   specifying	   and	   extending	   the	   circumstances	   under	   which	   the	  
Commission	   may	   request	   member	   states	   to	   adjust	   their	   fiscal	   position.	   Reform	   of	   the	   SGP’s	  
preventive	   arm	   focussed	   on	   further	   incentivizing	   member	   states	   to	   achieve	   their	   Medium-­‐Term	  
budgetary	  Objectives	  (MTOs).	  To	  ensure	  this,	  a	  benchmark	  was	  set	  up	  that	  anticipated	  the	  matching	  
of	   new	   expenditures	   with	   adequate	   resources,	   ‘placing	   a	   cap	   on	   the	   annual	   growth	   of	   public	  
expenditure	  according	  to	  a	  medium-­‐term	  rate	  of	  growth’	  (EC,	  2011:1).	  Moreover,	  a	  financial	  sanction	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  interest-­‐bearing	  deposit	  of	  0.2	  	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  (and	  even	  of	  a	  non-­‐interest	  bearing	  
deposit	   if	   no	   action	   is	   taken),	   can	   now	   be	   applied	   also	   under	   the	   preventive	   arm	   in	   case	   of	   a	  
‘continuous	  non-­‐correction’	   (EC,	  2011:1).	  The	  reform	  of	   the	  corrective	  arm	  traditionally	  centred	  on	  
its	  key	  instrument,	  the	  Excessive	  Deficit	  Procedure,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  fines,	  was	  also	  substantial.	  The	  
key	  novelty	  was	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  system	  of	  Reverse	  Qualified	  Majority	  Voting	   in	  the	  Council	  upon	  
the	  proposal	  of	  sanctions	  falling	  on	  member	  states,	   thus	   limiting	  the	  decision-­‐making	  power	  of	  the	  
Council	   on	   sanctions.	   Other	   elements	   included	   the	   operationalisation	   of	   the	   debt	   criterion	  
(previously,	   surveillance	  was	   solely	   focussed	   on	   deficit	   developments)	   and	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   new	  
benchmark	  of	  debt	  reduction	  of	  1/20th	  of	  the	  excess	  debt	  (i.e.	  the	  debt	  left	  over	  the	  60%	  debt/GDP	  
ceiling).	   Taken	   as	   a	   whole,	   the	   Commission	   can	   now	   deploy	   a	   stronger	   enforcement	   toolkit	   -­‐	   it	  
disposes	  of	  tougher,	  more	  diversified	  and	  more	  progressive	  financial	  sanctions	  which	  can	  be	  initiated	  
earlier.	   The	  pattern	  of	  policy	   change	   can	  be	   summarised	  as	   ‘more	  of	   the	   same’:	  more	   rules,	  more	  
sanctions,	   and	   more	   regulatory	   control.	   	   Previous	   policies	   and	   earlier	   institutional	   designs	   (the	  
Maastricht	  Treaty	  and	  the	  SGP)	  pre-­‐determined	  the	  final	  outcome	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  which	  underlines	  
a	   path-­‐dependence	   mechanism:	   	   ‘the	   euro-­‐zone	   is	   not	   breaking-­‐free	   of	   the	   Maastricht	   legacy’	  
(Featherstone,	  2012:	  24).	  This	  view	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	  a	  policy-­‐maker	  who	  stated	  ‘you	  foster	  the	  
system	  in	  which	  you	  have	  been	  operating’;	  ‘we	  tried	  to	  defend	  the	  system	  and	  improve	  it’.	  
	  
Other	  key	  policy	  transformations	  agreed	  upon	  also	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  SGP’s	  traditional	  scope.	  The	  first	  
novelty	  was	  the	  Macroeconomic	  Imbalance	  Procedure	  (MIP)	  which	  replicates	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  SGP	  
on	   current	   account/competitiveness	   imbalances	   and	  where	  non-­‐compliance	   can	   also	   lead	   to	   fines.	  
The	  second	  breakthrough	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  European	  Semester,	  a	  policy	  process	  tool	  whose	  aim	  is	  to	  
integrate	   and	   centralise	   all	   surveillance	   procedures	   into	   a	   single	   calendar	   cycle	   that	   precedes	   the	  
                                                
14 i.e.	  an	  exchange	  of	  favours.  
15 http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/12/germany-­‐france-­‐and-­‐euro  
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development	  of	  national	  fiscal	  plan	  for	  the	  year	  t+1.	  This	  inversion	  of	  the	  budgetary	  calendar	  ensures	  
that	  the	  logic	  of	  budget-­‐making	  in	  the	  EMU	  becomes	  more	  top-­‐down	  and	  vertically	  institutionalised.	  
The	  third	  development	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  fines	  on	  the	  manipulation	  of	  statistics	  (an	  obvious	  follow-­‐
up	   to	   the	   Greek	   crisis)	   could	   be	   applied	   to	   a	   ‘Member	   State	   that	   intentionally	   or	   by	   serious	  
negligence	   misrepresents	   deficit	   and	   debt	   data’	   (Regulation	   (EU)	   1173/2011,	   art.	   8).	   The	   last	   key	  
contribution	  of	  the	  Six	  Pack	  was	  to	  set	  up	  minimum	  requirements	  for	  national	  budgetary	  frameworks	  
with	  an	  insistence	  that	  member	  states	  move	  towards	  ‘multi	  annual	  budgetary	  planning’	  (EC,	  2010b:	  
2).	  
	  
The	  Two-­‐Pack:	  strengthening	  the	  arsenal	  	  
	  
In	   May	   2013,	   a	   package	   of	   two	   EU	   regulations,	   known	   as	   the	   “Two	   Pack”	   entered	   into	   force,	  
following	   a	   year	   and	   a	   half	   of	   negotiation	   between	   the	   European	   Commission,	   the	   European	  
Parliament	  and	  the	  EU	  Council	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  procedure.	  The	  Two-­‐Pack’s	  primary	  
goal	  was	  to	  strengthen	  the	  central	  control	  over	  the	  fiscal	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  policies,	  but	  only	  for	  
Eurozone	  members.	  Overall,	  the	  2	  Pack	  affected	  both	  the	  vertical	  distribution	  of	  powers,	  creating	  a	  
clearer	  budgetary	  hierarchy	  between	  the	  centre	  and	  member	  states	  as	  enshrined	   in	   the	  budgetary	  
timeline,	  and	  the	  horizontal	  distribution	  of	  powers	  –	  the	  Commission	  gained	  autonomy	  vis	  a	  vis	  the	  
Council.	  The	  process	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  year-­‐long	  blockade	  of	  the	  texts	  by	  the	  Parliament.	  
	  
Under	  the	  radar	  screen	  	  
	  
The	   power	   game	   surrounding	   the	   Two	   Pack	   evolved	   parallel	   to	   and	   in	   the	   shadow	   of	   two	   more	  
salient	  policy	  discussions:	   the	  elaboration	  and	   ratification	  of	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact	   and	   the	  European	  
Stability	  Mechanism	  Treaty.	  These	  two	  Treaties	  captured	  headlines:	  a	  basic	  search	  in	  the	  archives	  of	  
the	  FT.com	  for	  example	  provided	  408	  results	  for	  the	  Fiscal	  Compact,	  750	  results	  for	  the	  ESM	  and	  only	  
15	   results	   for	   the	   Two	   Pack16.	   Interviews	   held	   in	   Brussels	   confirm	   that	   the	   Two	   Pack	   was	   more	  
technical	   and	   more	   specific	   than	   the	   Six	   Pack	   and	   had	   been	   negotiated	   in	   a	   different	   climate:	  
‘everyone	  in	  the	  EP	  had	  an	  opinion	  on	  the	  Six	  Pack,	  it	  wasn’t	  the	  case	  for	  the	  2	  Pack.’	  	  Yet,	  as	  we	  can	  
see,	  the	  Two	  Pack	  is	  probably	  the	  legislation	  that	  goes	  the	  farthest	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  centralisation	  of	  
fiscal	  powers,	  in	  particular	  for	  Eurozone	  member	  states	  receiving	  financial	  assistance.	  
	  
In	   a	   context	  marked	  by	   a	   the	  de-­‐escalation	  of	  market	   pressure	   and	   decreasing	   interest	  within	   the	  
Council	  and	  Parliament	  compared	  to	  the	  Six	  Pack,	  the	  Two	  Pack	  gave	  additional	  centralised	  powers	  
to	  the	  European	  Commission.	  Such	  an	  EMU-­‐focused	  legislative	  package	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  new	  
article	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   that	   allowed	   for	   those	   member	   states	   who	   share	   the	   euro	   and	   are	  
exposed	  to	  higher	  externalities/interdependence	  to	  ‘strengthen	  the	  coordination	  and	  surveillance	  of	  
their	   budgetary	   discipline’	   (art.	   136-­‐1),	   i.e.	   further	   pooling	   their	   sovereignty.	   This	   new	   legal	   basis	  
enabled	   a	   relaxation	   of	   the	   consensus	   requirements	   among	   the	   EU28	   countries	   and	   provided	   EU	  
leaders	  with	  an	  escape	  route	  from	  the	  joint	  decision	  trap.	  Proposed	  in	  November	  2011	  and	  adopted	  
in	  May	  2013,	   the	  Two	  Pack	  occurred	   in	  a	  policy	  context	  made	  up	  of	  escalating	  and	  then,	  after	   July	  
2012,	  de-­‐escalating	  crisis	  induced	  pressure.	  Perhaps	  for	  this	  reason,	  the	  Commission	  found	  space	  to	  
act	  as	  a	  core	  actor.	  Interviews	  conducted	  point	  towards	  the	  crucial	  role	  played	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  
conceptualising	   and	   bringing	   forward	   the	   Two	   Pack:	   ‘The	   Two	   Pack?	   It	   was	   the	   Commission’.	   The	  
same	  EP	  official	  recalled	  ‘a	  top-­‐down	  push	  from	  the	  cabinet	  [Olli	  Rehn’s	  cabinet]	  to	  do	  more	  and	  to	  
do	   more	   Community	   method	   and	   a	   bottom	   up	   attention	   in	   DG	   ECFIN	   services	   where	   the	   staff	  
became	   more	   aware	   of	   what	   happens	   in	   the	   corrective	   arm	   of	   the	   SGP,	   after	   the	   Six	   Pack	  
                                                
16 The	  research	  was	  conducted	  on	  the	  17	  April	  2015	  using	  the	  search	  tool	  of	  the	  Financial	  Times	  web	  portal	  (	  
ft.com).   
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implementation’	  .	  	  In	  a	  context	  where	  there	  was	  an	  ‘outside	  pressure	  to	  do	  a	  bit	  more,	  the	  European	  
Commission	  took	  the	  chance’17	  .	  	  
	  
Interviewees	  also	  pointed	  to	  the	  swift	  consensus-­‐building	  on	  the	  Two	  Pack	  within	  the	  Council	  with	  no	  
major	  opposition	  to	  be	  noted.	  The	  Commission	  texts,	  proposed	  on	  23	  November	  2011,	  did	  not	  raise	  
key	   controversies.	   In	   fact,	   the	   EU	   Council	   reached	   political	   agreement	   on	   the	   Two	   Pack	   on	   21	  
February	  2012,	   just	   three	  months	  after	   the	  Commission	  made	   the	  proposal	  which	   implied	  a	  broad	  
alignment	  with	   the	   Commission.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   crisis	  may	   have	   had	   lasting	   effects	   on	   the	  
awareness	  among	  EU	  governments	  of	  the	  need	  to	  act	  together	  on	  fiscal	  coordination	  because	  of	  the	  
deep	   interdependence	   of	   Eurozone	   countries,	   illustrated	   during	   the	   course	   of	   the	   crisis	   and	  more	  
than	  two	  years	  after	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Greek	  fiscal	  crisis.	  	  
	  
The	   ease	   of	   translating	   the	   Council	   consensus	   into	   law	  was	   considerably	   slowed	  down	  by	   another	  
innovation	  provided	  by	   the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	   -­‐	   the	  extension	  of	  co-­‐decision	  to	  multilateral	   surveillance	  
which	   implied	   the	   involvement	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament.	   The	   final	   agreement	  with	   the	   EP	  was	  
reached	   one	   year	   later	   in	  May	   2013,	   since	   the	   EP	   was	   determined	   to	   withhold	   its	   vote	   until	   the	  
Commission	   tabled	  more	  ambitious	  proposals	  on	   the	  mutualisation	  of	  debt:	   ‘the	  whole	  process	  of	  
negotiation	  of	  the	  2	  Pack	  was	  a	  fight’18	  .	  Ultimately,	  the	  parliament’s	  negotiation	  tactics	  managed	  to	  
secure	  (1)	  the	  integration	  of	  some	  Fiscal	  Compact	  provisions	  in	  EU	  secondary	  law	  (De	  La	  Parra,	  2013),	  
(2)	  regular	  information	  on	  the	  surveillance	  measures	  taken	  and	  (3)	  the	  ability	  to	  organize	  a	  hearing	  to	  
be	  informed	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  budgetary	  plans	  as	  part	  of	  an	  economic	  dialogue	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  
results	  of	  the	  enhanced	  and	  post	  programme	  surveillance	  processes.	  In	  addition,	  in	  a	  side-­‐deal	  with	  
the	  Commission,	  the	  EP	  secured	  a	  high	  level	  report	  on	  a	  redemption	  fund	  and	  euro-­‐bills	  in	  exchange	  
for	  its	  support	  of	  the	  Two	  Pack.	  
	  
Crowning	  the	  Commission’s	  executive	  powers?	  
	  
The	   term	   ‘Two	   Pack’	   gives	   the	   misleading	   impression	   of	   a	   unifying	   logic	   in	   its	   objectives.	   At	   a	  
minimum,	   some	  unity	   resides	   in	   its	   scope	   (a	   strict	   focus	  on	   the	   Eurozone)	   and	   in	   its	   broad	   aim	   to	  
reinforce	   the	   EMU	   surveillance	   mechanisms	   to	   prevent	   contagion/spill-­‐over	   in	   the	   EMU.	   Its	   true	  
rationale	  was,	  however,	  to	  deal	  with	  institutional	  left-­‐overs	  and	  complete	  the	  unaccomplished	  work	  
which	   had	   not	   been	   performed	   by	   the	   previous	   reforms	   of	   the	   EMU’s	   economic	   governance	   (e.g.	  
mainly	   the	  Six	  Pack	   legislations).	  Apart	   from	   this,	   the	   two	   regulations	  pursued	   two	  different	  goals:	  
Regulation	  472/2013	  aimed	  at	  clarifying	  the	  procedure	  and	  competences	  to	  address	  member	  states	  
experiencing	   financial	   difficulties	   under	   so-­‐called	   ‘enhanced	   surveillance’.	   Among	   others,	   the	  
Commission	  may	  autonomously	  decide	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  objective	  criteria	  to	  subject	  a	  Member	  State	  
to	  enhanced	  surveillance	  and	  can	  prolong	   it	   if	   it	  deems	   it	  necessary.	  From	  a	   legal	  perspective,	   this	  
regulation	   also	   strove	   to	   ensure	   consistency	   between	   intergovernmental	   agreements	   and	   EU	   law,	  
notably	   on	   conditionality.	   As	   such	   it	   largely	   elaborated	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   operational	   guidelines	   of	  
both	  the	  European	  Financial	  Stability	  Facility	  (EFSF)	  and	  the	  European	  Stability	  Mechanism	  (ESM)	  and	  
lays	   down	   the	   legal	   frame	   of	   ‘macroeconomic	   adjustment	   programmes’	   for	   euro	   area	   countries	  
requesting	  financial	  assistance	  (European	  Commission,	  2013).	  
	  
Regulation	  473/2013,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  sought	  to	  lay	  down	  a	  procedure	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  draft	  
budgetary	  plans	   in	   the	  euro	  area.	  Driven	  by	   the	  need	   to	   further	   reinforce	   the	   central	   control	  over	  
fiscal	  policies,	   it	  set	  out	  both	  the	  conditions	  and	  procedures	  for	   the	  assessment	  of	  draft	  budgets	   in	  
the	   Eurozone	   and	   specified	   the	   corrective	   provisions	   in	   the	   case	   of	   excessive	   deficits	   in	   euro	   area	  
member	   states.	   	   Its	   purpose	  was	   to	   further	   institutionalise	   a	   crucial	   novelty	   of	   the	   Six	   Pack	   –	   the	  
European	   Semester.	   The	   Two	   Pack	   pushed	   the	   intrusiveness	   of	   the	   European	   Commission	   into	  
                                                
17 Interviewee	  8	  –	  13	  November	  2014,	  Brussels. 
18 Interviewee	  4	  –	  10	  December	  2014,	  Brussels. 
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domestic	   politics	   and	   policy-­‐making	   to	   a	   higher	   level.	   The	   Two	   Pack	   foresaw	   a	   clear	   and	   binding	  
timetable	  for	  the	  elaboration	  and	  discussion	  of	  national	  draft	  budgetary	  plans.	  It	  required	  Eurozone	  
member	  states	  to	  submit	  medium-­‐term	  fiscal	  plans	  by	  30	  April	  each	  year	  followed	  by	  the	  blueprint	  of	  
national	   budgets	   by	   15	  October.	   In	   case	   of	   serious	   non-­‐compliance	  with	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   SGP,	   the	  
Commission	  may	   request	   a	   revised	   draft	   budgetary	   plan.	   Several	   interviewees	   pointed	   to	   the	   fact	  
that	   with	   the	   Two	   Pack,	   Treaty	   provisions	   were	   stretched	   to	   their	   maximum:	   ‘we	   are	   using	   the	  
existing	   coordination	   provision	   to	   their	   full	   potential’19	   .	   The	   Two	   Pack	   impinges	   on	   core	   state	  
powers,	  which	  carries	   longer	  term	  implications	  for	   legitimacy.	  As	  a	  Commission	  official	  summarised	  
it,	  ‘with	  some	  historical	  distance,	  it	  is	  a	  folly.	  Never	  on	  earth	  could	  we	  have	  imagined	  this	  a	  few	  years	  
ago’20	  .	  
	  
The	  Fiscal	  Compact:	  an	  intergovernmental	  subterfuge?	  
	  
In	  its	  initial	  (German)	  conception,	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Fiscal	  Compact’s	  debt	  brake	  rule	  was	  meant	  to	  
be	   implemented	   through	  a	   Treaty	   revision,	   not	   through	  an	   international	   treaty	  negotiated	  outside	  
the	   EU	   framework.	   The	   Compact’s	   innovative	   shape	   should	   thus	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   second	   best	  
outcome	   for	   the	   EU	   and	   its	   main	   proposer,	   Germany.	   Its	   peculiar	   design	   resulted	   from	   the	   UK’s	  
strong	  reluctance	  and	  ultimate	  veto	  of	  an	  EU	  Treaty	  revision	  at	  the	  European	  Council	   in	  December	  
2011.	   The	  Compact’s	   rationale	  was	  part	   of	   a	   conditionality	   compromise	  made	   to	  Germany	   for	   the	  
injection	  of	  liquidity	  through	  the	  ESM	  and	  the	  ECB	  in	  a	  context	  marked	  by	  continuously	  rising	  Italian	  
and	   Spanish	   bond	   spreads.	   Its	   adoption	   did	   not	   alter	   the	   EU’s	   distribution	   of	   powers	   either	  
horizontally	  or	  vertically,	  nor	  did	   it	   result	   in	   the	  transfer	  of	  significant	   formal	  powers	   to	  the	  EU.	   Its	  
key	   contribution	  was	   rather	   symbolic:	   it	   sent	   a	   signal	   of	   commitment	   to	   sound	   finances	   at	   a	   time	  
when	  financial	  assistance	  was	  deployed	  throughout	  Europe.	  
	  
A	  straightjacket,	  but	  only	  on	  paper	  
	  
The	   main	   purpose	   of	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact	   was	   to	   enshrine	   a	   ‘balanced	   budget’	   rule	   into	   national	  
primary	   law,	   thus	   departing	   from	   the	   Maastricht	   requirement	   which	   focussed	   only	   on	   avoiding	  
‘excessive	  deficits’.	  The	  Compact	  provided	  that	  the	  ‘budgetary	  position	  of	  the	  general	  government	  of	  
a	   contracting	   party	   shall	   be	   balanced	   or	   in	   surplus’	   (TSCG,	   2012:	   art.	   2),	   thereby	   limiting	  member	  
states’	   budgetary	   discretion	   further.	   The	   structural	   budgetary	   position	  was	   operationalised	   as	   the	  
‘lower	  limit	  of	  a	  structural	  deficit	  (is)	  of	  0.5%	  of	  the	  gross	  domestic	  product	  at	  market	  prices’	  (TSCG,	  
2012:	  art.	  2).	  The	  Compact	  also	  foresaw	  that	  ‘in	  the	  event	  of	  significant	  observed	  deviations	  from	  the	  
medium	  term	  objective	  or	  the	  adjustment	  path	  towards	  it,	  a	  correction	  mechanism	  shall	  be	  triggered	  
automatically’	   (TSCG,	   2012:	   art.	   3).	   Lastly,	   it	   stipulated	   that	   these	   rules	   should	   be	   transposed	   into	  
national	  law	  ‘through	  provisions	  of	  binding	  force	  and	  permanent	  character,	  preferably	  constitutional,	  
or	   otherwise	   guaranteed	   to	   be	   fully	   respected	   and	   adhered	   to	   throughout	   the	   national	   budgetary	  
processes’	  	  (TSCG,	  2012:	  art.	  3).	  	  
	  
The	   Fiscal	   Compact	   was	   a	   highly	   salient	   political	   issue	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	   adoption.	   Yet,	   from	   the	  
beginning,	  policy-­‐makers	  questioned	  its	  added-­‐value	  compared	  to	  the	  previously	  adopted	  Six	  Pack.	  A	  
diplomat	  called	  it	  ‘an	  important	  distraction’	  while	  Mario	  Monti,	  then	  Italy’s	  Premier,	  described	  it	  as	  a	  
‘decorative	  songbird’	  (The	  Economist,	  2012);	  despite	  its	  entry	  into	  force,	  the	  Compact	  is	  by	  and	  large	  
un-­‐enforced	   (Alcidi	   &	   Gros,	   2014).	   Interviewees,	   both	   from	   the	   EP	   and	   from	   the	   EU	   Council,	  
confirmed	   this	   interpretation:	   ‘you	  do	   something	  on	   rules	  but	   then	   it	   is	  not	   followed’21;	   ‘the	  Fiscal	  
Compact	  is	  dead’22;	  ‘no	  one	  cares	  about	  it’23.	  In	  spite	  of	  its	  higher	  ranking	  in	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  norms,	  
                                                
19 Interviewee	  2	  –	  3	  November	  2014,	  Brussels. 
20 Interviewee	  9	  –	  8	  December	  	  2014,	  Brussels 
21
	  Interviewee	  8	  –	  13	  November	  2014,	  Brussels.	  	  
22
	  Interviewee	  7	  –	  29	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	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the	  Compact	   is	  no	  different	  than	  the	  ambitious	  EU	  declarations,	  such	  as	  Council	  conclusions,	  which	  
remain	   empty	   agreements.	   It	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	   largely	   symbolic	   and	   a	   suboptimal	   political	  
outcome	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  nature	  of	  the	  Six	  Pack	  and	  of	  the	  Two	  Pack:	  	  ‘it’s	  about	  
legal	   symbolism	  and	  the	  Germans	  are	  always	  caught	   in	   this’24.	  Analysing	  similar	  outcomes,	  Héritier	  
(1999;	  18-­‐19),	  following	  on	  Brunsson	  (1989),	  documented	  how	  the	  hypocritical	  creation	  of	  symbolic	  
political	   outcomes	   by	   separating	   talk	   from	   action	   could	   be	   used	   as	   an	   escape	   route	   to	   the	   EU’s	  
tendency	   towards	   deadlock.	   In	   bargaining	   theory	   this	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘framework	   solutions’	  
(Héritier,	  1999:	  19),	   i.e.	  political	  compromises	  which	  have	  been	  adopted	  despite	  a	  high	  diversity	  of	  
interests	  among	  actors	  and	  which	  are	  ‘not	  meant	  to	  be	  implemented	  because	  their	  realisation	  would	  
bring	   irreconcilable	   conflicts	   to	   the	   fore’	   (Héritier	  1999:19).	   The	  Fiscal	  Compact	   seems	   to	   illustrate	  
this	  phenomenon	  very	  well.	  	  
	  
In	   contrast	   to	   the	   Six	   Pack’s	   reliance	   on	   the	   Community	   method,	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact	   was	   an	  
intergovernmental	  and	  in	  particular	  a	  German	  project	  from	  the	  beginning.	  Concerned	  by	  the	  moral	  
hazard	   implications	   of	   the	   new	   financial	   firewalls	   (European	   Financial	   Stability	   Mechanism	   and	  
European	   Financial	   Stability	   Facility/European	   Stability	  Mechanism)	   and	   sceptical	   that	   the	   Six	   Pack	  
reform,	  a	  secondary	  law	  package,	  would	  send	  sufficiently	  reassuring	  signals	  to	  the	  markets	  and	  to	  its	  
(powerful)	   domestic	   institutions	   and	   electorate,	   Germany	   started	   pushing	   for	   the	   widespread	  
adoption,	  by	  all	  EU	  member	  states,	  of	  a	  constitutional	  debt	  brake	  to	  ensure	  fiscal	  discipline	  in	  the	  EU.	  
It	  was	  supported	  later	  by	  France	  and,	  decisively,	  by	  the	  newly	  appointed	  ECB	  President	  Mario	  Draghi	  
who	  called	  for	  a	  ‘Fiscal	  Compact’	  during	  his	  first	  hearing	  at	  the	  European	  Parliament’s	  plenary	  on	  1	  
December	  201125.	  
	  
On	   9	   December	   2011,	   a	   first	   outline	   of	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact	   was	   discussed	   by	   heads	   of	   state	   and	  
government	   at	   a	   European	   Council	   meeting.	   To	   the	   surprise	   of	   many,	   UK	   Prime	   Minister	   David	  
Cameron	  vetoed	  the	  text	  and	  attempted	  to	  obtain	  concessions	  and	  exemptions	  on	  financial	  markets	  
regulation.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   UK	   framed	   its	   opt-­‐out	   (i.e.	   its	   regular	   way	   to	   exit	   the	   EU’s	   joint	  
decision	   trap)	   as	   an	   ambitious	   shopping	   list	   of	   exemption	  measures	   impacting	   the	  City	   of	   London.	  
However,	  these	  requests	  were	  side-­‐payments	  that	  all	  other	  EU	  member	  states	  were	  not	  prepared	  to	  
grant	   to	   the	   UK:	   ‘he	   arrived	   with	   an	   unrealistic	   and	   unacceptable	   list	   of	   opt-­‐outs’26.	   As	   the	   same	  
official	   from	  the	  EU	  Council	  concluded:	   ‘Cameron	   is	  someone	  who	   is	  blinkered…he	  underestimated	  
the	   consensus	   for	   an	   intergovernmental	   treaty’27.	   Faced	   with	   a	   UK	   veto,	   agreement	   to	   proceed	  
without	  the	  UK	  outside	  the	  formal	  treaty	  framework	  was	  reached	  quickly28.	  Working	  discussions	  on	  
the	  text	  carried	  on	  and	  within	  one	  month,	  on	  30	  January	  2012,	  ‘heads’	  endorsed	  the	  text.	  The	  treaty	  
was	  signed	  a	  month	  later,	  on	  2	  March	  2012,	  by	  25	  European	  member	  states	  (all	  EU	  member	  states	  at	  
the	   time	   excluding	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   Czech	   Republic).	   The	   ECB	   greeted	   the	   Pact	   as	   ‘strengthening	  
confidence	  in	  the	  euro	  area’	  while	  German	  Chancellor	  Merkel	  welcomed	  it	  for	  being	  ‘a	  small	  but	  fine	  
step	  on	  the	  path	  to	  restoring	  confidence’29.	  Over	  the	  following	  weeks,	  the	  ESM	  Treaty	  was	  modified	  
to	  make	  a	  financial	  assistance	  request	  conditional	  on	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Fiscal	  Compact	  while,	  on	  
21	  December	  2011,	  the	  ECB	  extended	   its	  Long-­‐Term-­‐Refinancing	  Operations	  from	  12	  months	  to	  36	  
months	  to	  support	  bank	  lending	  further.	  	  
	  
The	  ultimate	  legal	  form	  of	  the	  agreement	  was	  not	  the	  only	  policy	  innovation	  of	  the	  Fiscal	  Compact.	  
The	  process	  through	  which	  the	  treaty	  was	  elaborated	  was	  completely	  novel	  too.	  The	  Commission’s	  
                                                                                                                                                   
23
	  Interviewee	  7	  –	  29	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	  
24
	  Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	   
25
	  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2011/html/sp111201.en.html	  	  
26 Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	  
27	  Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels. 
28	  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/david-­‐cameron-­‐blocks-­‐eu-­‐treaty  
29 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/31/us-­‐eu-­‐summit-­‐idUSTRE80S0SR20120131  
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traditional	  monopoly	  of	   initiative	  was	  sidelined	  and	  the	  same	  occurred	  on	  the	  Council	  side:	  ‘we	  by-­‐
passed	   everything,	   the	   COREPER	   and	   the	   General	   Affairs	   Council’30.	   In	   addition,	   new	   delegation	  
patterns	   emerged.	   The	  Economic	   and	   Financial	   Committee,	   an	  economic	  policy	   forum	  made	  up	  of	  
Treasury	   directors,	  was	   assigned	   the	   task	   of	   chairing	   the	   intergovernmental	   conference	   leading	   to	  
the	   elaboration	   of	   the	   new	   international	   treaty.	   In	   the	   background,	   the	   political	   preparation	   was	  
delegated	  to	  the	  Sherpas,	  the	  diplomatic	  advisors	  of	  EU	  leaders,	   located	  in	  the	  PM’s	  or	  Presidential	  
ministries.	   The	   European	   Parliament	  was	   granted	   the	   right	   to	   send	   three	   representatives	   and	   one	  
observer	   to	   the	   Sherpa	   group.	   MEPs	   began	   by	   snubbing	   the	   Sherpa	   Meetings	   ‘but	   they	   quickly	  
understood	  that	  it	  was	  there	  that	  the	  power	  was’31.	  Despite	  these	  new	  delegation	  patterns,	  it	  would	  
be	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  Compact	  sidelined	  all	  formal	  EU	  actors	  at	  
all	   times.	   Both	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Parliament	   did	   influence	   the	   process;	   significantly,	   they	  
obtained	  a	  provision	  under	  article	  16	  which	  specified	  that	  within	  five	  years	  following	  the	  entry	  into	  
force	  of	  the	  Treaty,	   ‘necessary	  steps	  shall	  be	  taken…with	  the	  aim	  of	   incorporating	  the	  substance	  of	  
this	  Treaty	  into	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  EU’	  (TSCG,	  2012:	  art.	  16).	  
	  
Overall,	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact	   came	   to	   symbolise	   what	   was	   later	   regarded	   as	   an	   intergovernmental	  
twist	   in	   EU	   decision-­‐making.	   It	   is	   probably	   too	   early	   to	   tell	   whether	   the	   liberties	   taken	   with	   the	  
standard	  modus	  operandi	  of	  the	  EU	  were	  only	  a	  result	  of	  the	  UK	  veto	  and	  the	  time	  pressure	  of	  the	  
moment	   and	   therefore	   ad	   hoc	   in	   nature,	   or	   whether	   they	   were	   illustrative	   of	   a	   lasting	   and	   ‘new	  
intergovernmentalism’	   cooperation	   pattern	   (Puetter,	   2014)32.	   	   Due	   to	   the	   current	   lack	   of	  
enforcement	   of	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact,	   one	   can	   be	   sceptical	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   working	  
method	   that	   led	   to	   the	   Fiscal	   Compact	   provides	   any	   guide	   for	   action	   in	   the	   future.	   Interviews	  
conducted	  with	  participants	  in	  the	  process	  revealed	  the	  inner	  tension	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  on	  this	  issue:	  
‘this	  mode	  of	  governance,	   it’s	  not	  perfect	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time	   it	   is	   realistic’33;	   ‘it	   is	  more	   realistic	  
politically	  but	  less	  efficient’34;	  ‘this	  informal	  process	  is	  useful	  but	  one	  should	  not	  forget	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
COREPER’35.	  	  	  
	  
Significance	  of	  Reforms:	  Orders	  of	  Change?	  
	  
Policies	  are	  complex	  constructs	  involving	  various	  institutional	  settings,	  instruments,	  techniques,	  and,	  
most	   importantly,	   policy	   paradigms	   (Hall,	   1993;	   Daigneault,	   2014).	   Hall	   identified	   three	   orders	   of	  
change	  which	  was	  later	  refined	  by	  Daigneault	  who	  distinguished	  between	  policy	  output	  and	  change	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  ideas.	  See	  Table	  3	  for	  an	  overview	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  three	  negotiations	  analysed	  here.	  
All	   three	   negotiations	   resulted	   from	   urgent	   and	   major	   changes	   in	   the	   setting	   of	   the	   existing	  
instruments	   given	   the	   nature	   and	   depth	   of	   the	   systemic	   crisis	   that	   unfolded	  within	   the	   Eurozone.	  
Second	   order	   change,	   defined	   as	   change	   in	   the	   instruments	   and	   techniques	   deployed	   within	   the	  
policy	   was	   also	   evident	   across	   all	   the	   three	   instruments.	   Both	   the	   ‘Six	   Pack’	   and	   ‘Two	   Pack’	  
represented	   major	   changes	   in	   the	   processes	   and	   instruments	   of	   economic	   governance-­‐enhanced	  
rules,	  timeframes	  and	  sanctions.	  Taken	  together	  they	  represent	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  balance	  between	  
the	   member	   states	   and	   the	   EU	   in	   relation	   to	   domestic	   budgets	   and	   public	   finances.	   The	   Fiscal	  
Compact	   represented	   a	   significant	   domestic	   change	   for	   most	   of	   the	   member	   states.	   Third	   order	  
change	  –	  change	  at	  the	  level	  of	  goals	  and	  priorities	  –	  requires	  a	  nuanced	  interpretation	  of	  the	  degree	  
of	   change.	  The	  Stability	  and	  Growth	  Pact	  was	  already	   committed	   to	  prudent	  budgeting	  and	   sound	  
public	   finances	   and	   these	   goals	   and	   priorities	   remain	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	   new	   system	   of	   economic	  
governance.	   However,	   the	   salience	   of	   these	   priorities	   was	   greatly	   enhanced	   by	   the	   tumult	   of	   the	  
                                                
30	  Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels. 
31 Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels. 
32
	  For	  example,	  the	  Sherpas	  represent	  a	  continuity	  with	  the	  Task	  Force	  Van	  Rompuy	  in	  which	  they	  were	  involved,	  as	  alternates.	  
33 Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	  
34 Interviewee	  8	  –	  13	  November	  2014,	  Brussels.	  
35
	  Interviewee	  5	  –	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels. 
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crisis	  and	  the	   fragilities	  exposed	   in	   the	  currency	  union.	   In	  addition	  to	  sound	  public	   finances,	  a	  new	  
priority	  was	  added	   -­‐	   the	   importance	  of	  macro-­‐economic	   imbalances	  as	   a	   source	  of	   concern	  within	  
the	  Eurozone.	  All	  programme	  countries	  suffered	  from	  a	  deteriorating	  macro-­‐economic	  profile	  in	  the	  
lead-­‐up	   to	   the	   crisis.	   Fourth	   order	   change	   –	   change	   at	   the	   level	   of	   overarching	   ideas	   –	   has	   not	  
occurred.	  Paradigm	  breakers	  such	  as	  the	  mutualisation	  of	  debt	  have	  not	  occurred.	  Rather	  there	  has	  
been	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  ideas	  about	  sound	  public	  finances.	  However,	  this	  article	  had	  
not	  analysed	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ECB	  which	  has	  broken	  the	  paradigm	  by	  becoming	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  
in	  practice	  if	  not	  de	  jure.	  	  
	  
	  
Resilience	  and	  Robustness	  in	  EU	  Negotiations	  and	  Policies	  
	  
The	   Eurozone	   crisis	   acted	   as	   an	   exogenous	   shock	   to	   an	   ill-­‐prepared	   system	   that	   lacked	   the	   policy	  
instruments	  and	  toolkit	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  challenges	  it	  faced.	  Given	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  pressure	  and	  
the	   clear	   evidence	   of	   contagion,	   doing	   nothing	   was	   not	   an	   option	   for	   Europe’s	   leaders.	   Thus,	  
notwithstanding	  the	  length	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  acute	  phase	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  crisis,	  the	  Union’s	  decision-­‐
making	   process	   did	   not	   face	   gridlock.	   Rather,	   its	   capacity	   proved	   resilient36	   as	   the	  member	   states	  
found	  sufficient	  consensus	  to	  pass	  a	  complex	  range	  of	  legislative	  acts	  and	  an	  international	  treaty	  in	  
the	  area	  of	  economic	  governance	  and	  a	  new	  financial	  perspective	  that	  runs	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.	  
Path	  dependency	  was	  apparent	   in	   the	  key	  provisions	  on	  economic	  governance	  as	   the	  Six	  Pack	  and	  
Two	   Pack	   represented	   a	   hardening	   and	   layering	   of	   the	   original	   Stability	   and	   Growth	   Pact,	   not	   an	  
entirely	  new	  invention.	  The	  Fiscal	  Compact	  was	   largely	  symbolic	  and	  responded	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  
the	  dominant	  member	  state,	  Germany,	   for	   legal	  assurances	  on	  debt	  and	  deficits.	   It	   formed	  part	  of	  
the	  domestic	  political	  management	  of	  the	  development	  of	  new	  policy	  instruments,	  notably	  the	  EFSF	  
and	   the	   ESM.	   The	   decision	   to	   adopt	   a	   treaty	   outside	   the	   formal	   treaty	   framework	   was	   taken	   to	  
overcome	  the	  veto	  power	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  
	  
The	   Treaty	   of	   Lisbon	   had	   an	   important	   impact	   on	   the	   negotiations	   of	  many	   of	   the	   new	  measures	  
because	   it	   pre-­‐structured	   the	   negotiating	   process.	   The	   horizontal	   balance	   of	   power	   among	   EU	  
institutions	  changed	  and	  process	  innovation	  was	  evident.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  Commission	  President,	  in	  
this	  case	  Herman	  Van	  Rompuy,	  had	  an	  important	  effect	  on	  agenda-­‐setting	  on	  economic	  governance.	  
Because	  there	  was	  a	  Council	  President	  in	  March	  2010,	  the	  European	  Council	  could	  call	  on	  him	  rather	  
than	  the	  Commission	  President	  to	  chair	  the	  Task	  Force	  on	  Economic	  Governance.	  This	  ensured	  there	  
was	   a	   contest	   in	   agenda-­‐setting	   on	   the	   new	   economic	   governance	   provisions	   although	   the	  
Commission	  retained	  the	  responsibility	  of	  making	  the	  formal	  legislative	  proposals	  on	  both	  the	  Six	  and	  
Two	  Pack.	  The	  European	  Council	  President	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  end	  game	  of	  the	  MFF	  
negotiations,	   brokering	   a	   deal	   in	   February	   following	   a	   failed	   European	   Council	   in	  November	   2012.	  
The	   President’s	   role	   in	   the	   MFF	   negotiations	   came	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   rotating	   Presidencies	  
because	  once	  an	  issue	  is	  on	  the	  European	  Council	  agenda,	  it	  is	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  Council	  President.	  
The	  second	  major	  impact	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  treaty	  was	  the	  opportunity	  it	  gave	  the	  European	  Parliament	  in	  
the	   legislative	   process.	   Although	   only	   four	   of	   the	   six	   legislative	   acts	   that	   made	   up	   the	   Six	   Pack	  
required	  co-­‐decision,	  the	  EP	  was	  in	  a	  position	  to	  influence	  all	  the	  acts	  by	  treating	  them	  as	  a	  package	  
deal	   and	   engaging	   intensively	   in	   the	   trilogues.	   During	   the	   MFF	   negotiations,	   the	   EP	   also	   had	  
enhanced	   influence	   since	   its	   consent	   was	   necessary	   for	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   agreement.	   The	  
influence	  of	  the	  Commission	  varied	  across	  the	  different	  negotiations.	  It	  retained	  its	  role	  in	  proposing	  
the	  initial	  draft	  of	  the	  MFF	  and	  drafted	  all	  of	  the	  EU	  legislative	  acts.	  Agenda-­‐setting	  on	  the	  Six	  Pack	  
was	  a	  complex	  process	  given	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Task	  Force	  and	  the	  Commission.	  It	  had	  a	  freer	  hand	  in	  
relation	   to	   the	   Two	   Pack	   because	   of	   the	   de-­‐escalation	   of	   the	   crisis	   and	   the	   activism	   of	   the	   Rehn	  
                                                
36 Following	  the	  framework	  provided	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  euro	  crisis	  response	  by	  Joachim	  Schild	  in	  his	  introductory	  remarks	  to	  the	  
conference	  ‘Five	  Years	  of	  Crisis	  –	  Lessons	  Learned	  and	  Paths	  Towards	  a	  Resilient	  European	  Monetary	  Union’	  University	  of	  Trier,	  October	  
9th-­‐10th,	  2014. 
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cabinet	  and	  Commission	  services.	  The	  Commission’s	  role	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  economic	  
governance	   regime	  was	   immensely	   strengthened	  as	   it	  was	  given	  enhanced	  powers	  of	   surveillance,	  
monitoring,	  review	  and	  sanctioning.	  	  
	  
The	   crisis	   had	   a	  major	   impact	   on	   the	   content	   of	   the	   new	   economic	   governance	   regime	   as	   it	   was	  
crafted	   as	   a	   direct	   response	   to	   pressure	   from	   the	  markets	   and	   from	   the	   creditor	   countries	   in	   the	  
Eurozone.	  Given	  market	  volatility	  and	  the	  constant	  threat	  of	  contagion,	  there	  was	  a	  need	  to	  reassure	  
markets	   that	   the	   Eurozone	   could	   solve	   its	   problems	   and	   survive.	   The	   creditor	   countries	  were	   also	  
determined	   that	   in	  addressing	   the	  problems	  of	   the	  programme	  countries,	   they	  would	  also	  address	  
the	   design	   faults	   of	   the	   single	   currency.	   Thus	   crisis	   management	   and	   crisis	   prevention	   were	  
intertwined	  from	  the	  outset.	  The	  ECB	  also	  demanded	  reassurance	  from	  the	  member	  states	  that	  if	  it	  
engaged	  in	  non-­‐standard	  measures,	  the	  Governments	  would	  also	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  economic	  
governance.	   Cumulatively,	   this	   led	   to	   a	   step	   change	   in	   economic	   governance	   characterised	   by	   a	  
hardening	  of	  the	  rules	  both	  on	  the	  preventive	  and	  corrective	  arms	  of	  the	  regime,	  a	  ratcheting	  up	  of	  
monitoring	  and	  surveillance,	  and	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  sanctions	  regime.	  Both	  in	  terms	  of	  process	  
and	   content,	   domestic	   budgets	   were	   encased	   in	   a	   set	   of	   procedures	   captured	   by	   the	   European	  
Semester.	  	  
	  
The	   crisis	   triggered	   a	   major	   policy	   response	   from	   the	   European	   Union,	   particularly	   within	   the	  
Eurozone.	  It	  induced	  agreement	  on	  far	  reaching	  changes	  in	  economic	  governance	  which	  will	  play	  out	  
in	  the	  next	  phase	  of	  economic	  and	  monetary	  integration.	  The	  new	  system	  involves	  horizontal	  policy-­‐
making	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  and	  EU	  member	  state	  engagement	  on	  the	  annual	  recommendations	  that	  flow	  
from	   the	   European	   Semester.	   How	   the	   member	   states	   respond	   to	   the	   changes	   and	   the	   policy	  
prescriptions	   of	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Council	  will	   be	   a	  major	   test	   of	   the	   new	   regime.	  Will	   the	  
member	  states	  display	  a	  high	   level	  of	  compliance	  with	  the	  new	  regime	  or	  will	   it	   trigger	  a	  domestic	  
backlash	  given	   that	  many	  of	   the	   fields	  addressed	   in	   the	  economic	  governance	   regime	  are	  national	  
competencies?	   Just	   how	   much	   flexibility	   the	   Commission	   will	   display	   in	   interpreting	   the	   rules	   is	  
difficult	   to	   predict	   although	   it	   appears	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	   economic	   governance	   regime	   cannot	  
become	  a	  straitjacket	  for	  the	  member	  states.	  The	  EU	  and	  Eurozone	  are	  still	  faced	  with	  the	  challenge	  
of	  creating	  an	  environment	  which	  is	  conducive	  to	  structural	  change	  of	  many	  sensitive	  areas	  of	  policy.	  
Moreover,	   because	   the	   acute	   phase	  of	   the	   crisis	   has	   abated,	   the	  member	   states	  may	  not	   feel	   the	  
need	  to	  continue	  to	  address	  the	  design	  faults	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  and	  go	  much	  beyond	  what	  has	  
been	  agreed	  so	  far.	  In	  line	  with	  earlier	  predictions	  of	  the	  ‘rise	  of	  regulatory	  state	  in	  Europe’	  (Majone,	  
1994),	  the	  EU	  is	  following	  a	  process	  of	  ‘regulatory	  state	  building’	  in	  fiscal	  matters	  (Schelkle,	  2009:1).	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  EU	  finds	  itself	  trapped	  in	  an	  unprecedented	  situation	  (Hallerberg,	  2014):	  while	  there	  
is	  no	  substantial	  EU	  fiscal	  capacity,	  the	  EU	  has	  a	  strong	  central	  regulatory	  power	  to	  control	  national	  
budgets.	   The	   crisis	   did	   not	   induce	   agreement	   on	   fiscal	   federalism	   or	   on	   debt	   mutualisation,	  
instruments	   that	   would	   be	   profoundly	   transformative	   for	   the	   EU	   and	   European	   integration.	  
Agreement	  on	  the	  centralisation	  of	  banking	  supervision,	  the	  Banking	  Union,	  was	  the	  high	  watermark	  
of	  federalism	  and	  centralisation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  
	  
It	  remains	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  the	  crisis	   is	  over.	  The	  member	  states	  and	  EU	  institutions	  brought	  the	  
acute	   phase	   of	   the	   crisis	   under	   control	   but	   did	   not	   address	   many	   of	   the	   underlying	   causes	   and	  
legacies.	   Public	   and	   private	   debt	   remains	   very	   high,	   particularly	   in	   the	   troubled	   countries.	   Europe	  
continues	  to	  face	  the	  prospect	  of	  low	  growth	  and	  low	  inflation	  which	  exacerbates	  the	  debt	  problems.	  
Unemployment	  remains	  high	   in	  many	  countries,	  particularly	  youth	  unemployment.	   	  A	  cleavage	  has	  
opened	  up	   between	   the	   core	   and	   periphery	  within	   the	   Eurozone	   and	   the	   overall	  macro-­‐economic	  
stance	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  area	  is	  far	  from	  optimal.	  To	  date,	  the	  resilience	  and	  robustness	  of	  the	  
policy-­‐making	  system	  has	  averted	  disaster	  and	  the	  implosion	  of	  the	  Euro	  but	  has	  not	  created	  a	  stable	  
policy	  environment	  for	  the	  longer	  term.	  The	  member	  states	  remain	  deeply	  divided	  concerning	  core	  
questions	  of	  fiscal	  and	  economic	  policy	  and	  capacity	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  	  	  
	  
  12	  
The	   resilience	  of	   the	  Union’s	   policy-­‐making	   system	   in	   the	   face	  of	   the	   crisis	  was	   accompanied	  by	   a	  
fracture	  between	  policy-­‐making	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  member	  states.	  The	  world	  of	  the	  Brussels	  beltway	  
appeared	   immune	   to	   the	   political	   fall-­‐out	   within	   the	   member	   states.	   Across	   Europe	   incumbent	  
governments	  lost	  power	  and	  volatility	  characterised	  electoral	  outcomes	  and	  party	  systems.	  Heads	  of	  
government	   represented	   in	   the	   European	   Council	   were	   caught	   in	   the	   crosswinds	   of	   demands	   for	  
collective	   responsibility,	   particularly	   in	   the	   Eurozone,	   and	   the	   demands	   of	   their	   electorates.	  
Responsibility	  to	  the	  collective	  came	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  electorates.	  EU	  constraints	  on	  
domestic	  economic	  policies	  have	  been	  increased	  at	  perhaps	  a	  longer	  term	  cost	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  both	  
EU	   and	   domestic	   governance	   and	   governments.	   Electoral	   instability	   at	   the	   domestic	   level	   and	   the	  
growing	   weight	   of	   Eurosceptic	   parties	   in	   the	   EP	   and	   the	   member	   states	   may	   not	   undermine	   the	  
robustness	  of	  the	  Union’s	  policy-­‐making	  system	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  but	  may	  do	  so	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	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Table	  1:	  The	  varying	  decision	  rules	  in	  economic	  governance	  reform	  
Reform	  Initiative	   Legal	  Nature	   Decision	  Rule	   Member	   State	  
Involvement	  
Six	  Pack	   Secondary	  EU	  Law	   QMV	   among	   the	  
member	   states	   (Art	  
121)	  
All	  
Fiscal	  Compact	   International	  Treaty	   Unanimity	   among	  
signatures	  
All	   except	   UK	   and	  
Czech	  Republic	  
Two	  Pack	   Secondary	  EU	  Law	   QMV	   among	   Eurozone	  
states	  	  Art	  136	  
Eurozone	   member	  
states	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Grid	  of	  Economic	  Governance	  Negotiations	  	  
Concept	   Sub-­‐Categories	   Value	  
Importance	  of	  Change	   Major	  or	  Minor	  Change	   Major	  Change	  
Direction	  of	  Change	   Path	  breaking	  or	  path-­‐dependent	   Path	  Dependent	  
Form	  of	  Process	   Drift,	  conversion,	  layering,	  displacement	   Layering	  
Timing	  of	  Change	   Short-­‐long	  term	   Short	  and	  long	  term	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Orders	  of	  Change	  
	  
	   ‘Six	  Pack’	   ‘Two	  Pack’	   Fiscal	  Compact	  	  
1st:	  Change	  in	  
setting	  of	  
existing	  policy	  
Major	  change	  due	  to	  market	  
turbulence	  and	  political	  
management	  of	  bail-­‐outs	  
Major	  change	  due	  to	  
crisis	  and	  designed	  only	  
for	  Eurozone	  
Major	  change	  due	  to	  
crisis	  and	  political	  
management	  in	  
Germany	  
2nd:	  Change	  in	  
instruments	  and	  
Techniques	  
Major	  change	  in	  both	  the	  
prevention	  and	  corrective	  
arms-­‐	  enhanced	  sanctions.	  
New	  decision	  rule-­‐	  Reverse	  
Qualified	  Majority	  Voting	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  Excessive	  
Deficit	  Procedure	  
Institutional	  leftovers	  
from	  the	  ‘Six	  Pack’	  
which	  together	  with	  the	  
‘Two	  Pack’	  greatly	  
strengthen	  the	  
surveillance	  capacity	  of	  
the	  Commission	  	  
‘Domestic	  debt	  
break	  was	  an	  
innovation	  in	  many	  
member	  states	  




Major	  change:	  Introduction	  of	  
the	  Macroeconomic	  
Imbalance	  Procedure	  
(MIP)/Fines	  concerning	  the	  
manipulation	  of	  statistical	  
data	  and	  the	  European	  
Semester	  
Designed	  to	  address	  
means	  rather	  than	  ends-­‐
process	  and	  procedure	  	  
Enhancement	  of	  the	  





No	  paradigmatic	  shift	  in	  terms	  
of	  goals	  and	  priorities	  but	  a	  
paradigmatic	  shift	  in	  terms	  of	  
surveillance	  of	  the	  domestic	  
by	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  EU	  
Contributes	  to	  the	  
paradigmatic	  shift	  of	  
enhanced	  surveillance	  	  
No	  paradigmatic	  
shift	  
List	  of	  interviews	  
	  
  14	  
Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  Brussels	  from	  20	  October	  2014	  to	  12	  December	  2014.	  
To	  maximize	   the	   collection	  of	  observations	  on	   such	  a	   sensible	   subject,	   Chatham	  House	   rules	  were	  
applied	   and	   confidentiality	   was	   guaranteed	   to	   the	   interview	   partners.	   As	   a	   result,	   interviews	   are	  
anonymized	  and	  only	  the	  primary	  affiliation	  of	  the	  interview	  partners	  is	  apparent.	  	  	  
	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  1,	  EU	  Council	  official,	  19	  November	  2014,	  Brussels.	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  2,	  European	  Commission	  official,	  3	  November	  2014,	  Brussels	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  3,	  European	  Parliament	  official,	  1	  December	  2014,	  Brussels.	  	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  4,	  European	  Parliament	  official,	  10	  December	  2014,	  Brussels	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  5,	  EU	  Council	  official,	  22	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	  	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  6,	  European	  Commission	  official,	  5	  December	  2014,	  Brussels.	  	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  7,	  European	  Parliament	  official,	  29	  October	  2014,	  Brussels.	  	  
-­‐ Interviewee	  8,	  European	  Parliament	  official,	  13	  November	  2014,	  Brussels.	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